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Intergovernmental Revenue Assignment and Mobilization 
Principles and Applications for Somalia 
 
 
Introduction: Purpose and Scope 
 
The World Bank’s report on Somalia Economic Update/Special Focus on Intergovernmental Relations 
concludes that although Somalis face a daunting and long term development challenge  to overcome two 
decades of conflict and fragility,  with a commitment of a new government substantial progress is being 
made to support a potentially  vibrant private sector economy,  improve human and economic 
development outcomes,  and prioritize the establishment of  intergovernmental (central  and member 
government)  institutions for effective macro-fiscal management (World Bank,  2015).   
 
A  dimension of  importance to achievement of these broad reform objectives is to now “focus on (and 
to) … facilitate on-  going negotiations(s)… for a way forward rather than finding a final f iscal 
arrangement”(World Bank,  2015).   This perspective a setting a knowledge base for “a way forward” is the 
same advice that   Janos Kornai made during the 1990s transition   of Central and Eastern European 
countries    from a demonstrably poor and slow growth command-and control economy to one   liberalized 
markets and public  sector reform— that   “a change of government is not a change of system,  merely one 
of the pre-conditions for it”…and that,  the “change of system is an historical process that seems likely to 
require a long period of time”.  (Kornai,  1992).  The World Bank 2015 report notes that the reform of public  
institutions take 20 years even in the fastest-of reforming economies.   
 
Such a timeframe for setting the pre-conditions for a sustainable public  sector is not a counsel for delay.    
Indeed   today’s Somalia  faces a set of c ircumstances that have similarities other now well-established 
and effective federal states.  There are four such similarities.   The first is these countries had   features of 
“bottom-up” federalism whereby the member states had to learn to collaborate --a collaboration often 
characterized by a high degree of tension—to create a functioning   central state (e.g.,  Australia,    Canada, 
Switzerland,  and United States).1  An important  aspect  of a “bottom up” system  is that the from the start 
of the reform process the subnational governments that come together to create a federal system bring 
with them a revenue culture of decentralized fiscal autonomy and capacity that pays-off over the decades 
in terms of f iscal sustainability and economic development.   In contrast,     many historically  centralized 
states find “top down” fiscal culture that becomes an obstacle to achieving public  sector reform —an 
obstacle that is becoming more evident in an era of the globalization,  (World Bank,  WDR,  1999-2000,  pg. 
31-33l;   Congleton,  2006.).  For the   Somalia,  the fact that its   once and potentially future federal member 
states (FMS)  of Somaliland and Puntland are,  at present,  more public  administration capable that the 
federal government of Somali (FGS) can be seen as nation-building advantage.  2   
 
Second,  societies that have been and remain   fragmented   in the sense of having   a “territorial based 
groups of people who are or who consider themselves to be,  distinct in one or more features such as 
ethnicity,  religion,  language,  and,  or history,  ancient or recent”,  the sorting out of power and wealth 
sharing arrangements has become a “glue” for creating a nation state (e.g.,  Belgium,    Canada,    Germany, 
India,  Indonesia,  People’s Republic  of China,  Philippines,  Spain).3   
 
Third,  after an era of conflict  warring parties  have been able to settle on a set of principles that allow for 
an “effective” state in terms not   only  to how effic iently and equitably  provide public  services,  but also 
how a  the various aspects of a country’s public  f inances are structured (e.g.,   Indonesia.  Northern I reland,   
Switzerland).4    
 
A fourth similarity for today’s Somalia is that is far from alone in now making an effort to overcome an 
history of conflict and  colonialism   in order to become an “own  functioning”  society.5    Federalism is 
aways a work in progress.  (Watts,  2008).      
 
From Fragility to a Functional Federalism: The Case for Being Intergovernmental 
 
                                                                                  
1  And, all four now federally mature countries have experienced periods of conflict.   As Linder discusses, it would 
be “fundamentally wrong” to think of Switzerland as a country without historical conflicts. Switzerland is a country  
created by different  ethnic groups    speaking different languages and following different religions and thus having 
to deal with processes of nation-building that in many  ways are :comparable with processes in developing 
countries today (Linder,1994). For the US, the 1861-65 Civil War (War Between the Confederate and Federal 
States) was a “.defining event” that far more than the war for independence (1775-1783) from Great Britain 
consolidated a nation    politically, economically, and ideologically (Hummel, 2007). Canada, which was   founded in 
1867as a centralized federation (but since then has become highly decentralized), had its conflicts (notably the Rebellions 
of 1837-1837 of Upper vs. Lower Canada). During 1922-1926 an  Australian Civil War (1922-1926) was a war fought between 
the Republic of Australia  and the self- declared Queensland Republic (for an overview of Australian federalism see Saunders, 
2005 and World Bank, 2015)  
2 FGS: federal government of Somalia. FMS: federal member state.  
3  Bird and Viallancourt, xxxx; Zahar  ccc     
4 For a review of the role played as a strategy for nation /peace building in conflict affected states see Bird and Ebel 
(2007) Bird, Vaillancourt, and Roy-Cesar (2010), Zahar (2013) and, specifically for Somalia, Ross (September 2014).  
5 Watts (2008); UNECA (2010); Ross (2014) 
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The working premise of this Briefing Note is that there is a ready willingness of Somalis to explore the 
transition from a “fragile state”  to that of a functioning federal nation-state; that is,  a   system of 
governance whereby an agreed upon Constitution provides for a “coming together”  in an alliance of 
constituent    (member) governments,  each of which recognize the legitimacy of a central government on 
some matters once exclusively the responsibility of the indiv idual member states. 6   (Provisional 
Constitution,  Artic le 50).    Federalism is a system of voluntary agreement upon (i)  a set of   shared rules   
as well as ( ii)  areas for self-rule whereby each constituent unit recognizes the merits of the of a system of 
intergovernmental cooperation  but at the same time remains  politically  accountable to its own 
electorate (Provisional Constitution,  Artic le 50).  7,  8     
To accomplish this coming-together objective,  a task for today’s Somali task  is to engage in a dialogue of 
the principles and practices of the sorting out of the   f iscal roles among the Federal Government of 
Somalia its member states,  sub-state governments,  and,  likely  at some point in the process,  creating 
regional governments and multi-state compacts.  9.  10    
 
And,    there is a good case for getting this set of intergovernmental arrangement right.   As the public 
finance literature attests,  a well-  designed,  well implemented system of intergovernmental f iscal 
arrangements can lead to improved effic iency in the utilization of a  society’s limited resources of land, 
labor,  capital and entrepreneurship; increases in the level and effectiveness of the delivery of public  
services,  and,  as a result of the convergence of these two factors,  enhanced macro-stabilization and 
economic growth (Ebel and Yilmaz,  2004; Boadway and Shah,  2015)   
 
To be c lear,  however,  for a society to realize these potential payoffs much –a great deal—depends on the 
design and capacity of the intergovernmental institutions,  a design that what may work for one 
                                                                                  
6   In some federations constitutions are   explicit that there is   no fiscal hierarchy among certain types of 
governments (e.g., Australia, Canada, India, Pakistan, Switzerland, and the United states).   Others are 
constitutionally federal but in which there is a hierarchical (unitary) element whereby the central government is, as 
Shah describes, “at the apex” of the intergovernmental arrangement. Bird (Cuba Notes, 2005) makes the distinction 
between   “loose” (Canada, Switzerland, United States, and “tight” Ethiopia, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia) 
federal systems. Present day Somalia is difficult to categorize. It is a   nascent system of “bottom up” federalism, 
thus, “loose”, and likely to remain so for some time.         
7 Federalism is typically presented as in the middle of a continuum between that of a unitary and con-federate 
arrangement (Bird, 2005; Watts, 2008; World Bank, 2015). A unitary system is one in which the central government 
as the constitutionally bestowed authority to   determine what political powers are assigned to ”their” sub-central 
units, but also whether or create, abolish, or change the boundaries of the sub-central jurisdiction. Examples abound 
(Muwonge and Ebel, 2014).   A confederation is a system in which a politically and fiscally weak central government 
serves and an agent of the member units which have significant spending or taxing lowers (Shah, 2007; Fox and 
Wallich, 2007).  
8  Bird, 2005   
9 At present, a political map of Somalis will show eighteen (18) administrative divisions, which the World Bank report 
presents as regions (World Bank, 2015, Table 8.4). The Provisional constitution (2012  ,Article 48) states that no 
single region can stand alone as a government, as until such time as a region merges with another region(s)  to form 
a new Federal Member State (FMS), a region shall be directly administered by the Federal government for a 
maximum of two years. It is not clear what a regions formal fiscal role is if its residents do not join a member state.   
10 The topic   creating joint service delivery districts will not be addressed in this report; but the principles laid out 
herein can be applied in a subsequent report the pros and cons of general vs. special purpose governments.     
intergovernmental system may not be right for another.11 And,  to add to the discussion,  there is also 
research that concludes that within a nation-state,  the sorting out of intergovernmental roles and 
responsibilities among governments may be asymmetric.  Thus,  some countries with a federal form of 
governance have come to a cooperative agreement that for purposes of overall effic iency enhancing and 
political solidarity there is merit in giving some constituent units f lexibility in accommodating different 
needs.  These differences may be spatial (e.g.,  in terms of natural resource endowment,  geography,  size 
of the unit),  economic (e.g.,    rural vs,  urban),  and/or social and cultural ( language,  ethnicity.  religion).  12   
 
For purposes of this discussion,  two key   points emerge.   The first is that for intergovernmental system to 
be capable—to function in a sustainable way—there is  a set of fundamental principles that apply to all 
intergovernmental (and in Somali’ s case,  a federal)  society that are then adapted locally.   As Bird (2005) 
puts it:  universal principles with local applications.   
  
The second is that for federalism to “work” both the central governments and the fiscally  sovereign 
member states must become develop the intergovernmental capacity generate revenues in order to pay 
for public  goods.13        
  
 Four Fundamental Questions  
 
 There are four fundamental questions facing any intergovernmental society (Bird,  1996).   
   
 Expenditure Assignment.  Which type of government,  central and local,  delivers which set of 
public  sector services?     
 
 Revenue Assignment.  Which revenues are most appropriate for use by which type of 
government?   
 
   Intergovernmental Financial Transfers.  How can fiscal imbalances among the federation’s 
constituent units be resolved when one learns that the amount Somali shillings (dollar,  birr, 
franc,  pound,  rand,  renminbi,  rand…) required to satisfy the expenditure and revenue 
assignment amounts do not add up to the same number.    And,   
 
 Borrowing and Debt Management. How shall the timing of receipts for f inancing the public’s 
capital be structured and   monitored?   
                                                                                  
11Bird, Ebel, Wallich, 1995; Brinkerhoff and Johnson, 2009; Yilmaz, Vaillancourt and Dafflon, 2012; A recent and 
thorough review of the literature is provided by Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Penas, and Sacchi, 2015). 
12 Congleton, 2006; Bird, Vaillancourt, and Roy-Cesar (2010) 
13 There are three aspects to capacity building: (i) addressing the four fundamental questions listed below 
(organizational capacity); (ii) developing a set of governmental agencies and instrumentalities accompanied by a   
clear and transparent set of enabling rules and regulations for their operation (institutional capacity), and (iii) 
developing a knowledge base and system of learning so that individuals can make the first two forms of capacity 
effective (individual capacity).  
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To list these four core questions is the starting point for organizing the pre-conditions for Somali public  
sector reform.  The next task is to work through them in a manner that reflects Somalia’s special social, 
geographical,  historical and political c ircumstances (World Bank,  2015,  p37).    And,  although   no single 
set of rules of how and in what form its federal system will evolve,    as time passes a set policy options, 
and the tradeoffs among them,  will emerge that require Somali policymakers and practitioners to 
continually  research and evaluate how specific  revenue arrangements in one era may need to be 
adjusted in another era in order to “fit”  Somalia’s changing econom ic,  demographic,  institutional and 
technological trends –that is,  f its its “fiscal architecture”.  (Wallace,  2003; World Bank,  2015)  But,  even 
with such changes overtime,  the principles of federalism,  and with that,  the four   fundamental 
questions will not change.  Indeed,  one of the most important merits of a well-designed and well-
implemented   federal system is that it is a system that accommodates a nation’s changing fiscal 
architecture.   (Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt,  2014)  
 
Organization of the Remainder of This Briefing Note  
 
The focus of this  Briefing Note is on second of the  four core questions of intergovernmental f inance-- the 
process of sorting out revenue authority and responsibility  between  the central government (the Federal 
Government of Somalia,  FGS) and its  and subnational  (state,  regional,  district,  municipal/SNG ) 
partners.14,  15  As will be  discussed   below,    some revenues assigned may be exclusive to the FSG,  while 
others will be reserved for the member states and their local governments;  and still other types of revenue 
will be  concurrent  in their application..   The purpose of this Note is to lay out the framework—a   way of 
thinking-   of   how this all gets worked out.  The payoff   to getting the assignment question  right will go 
a long way to allowing Somalia to seize upon what many view as a  present turning point from that of a 
fragile to a functioning state.  (World Bank,  2015,  p 38-39; ICG,  February 2017).   
 
 This Briefing Note is organized in what can be labeled a “stylized sequence”.   The reference here to 
“stylized” is made because the reality  is that rather than be a smooth step-by-step sequence,  the practice 
of the intergovernmental reform process and its outcome will be framed and,  in some cases constrained, 
by the pace at which Somalia’s   different types   of   governments   develop their   organizational,  
institutional,  and bureaucratic  capacity (Thomas,  2006; OECD DAC,  2016);  World Bank,  2015).  The uneven 
nature how this sequence flows is reinforced in the case of Somalia due to what the World Bank (2015) 
refers to as the “state of state formation” –that is how overtime the nascent Federal government of 
                                                                                  
14 Throughout this Briefing Note the state/local/regional/local… types of government may be referred to subnational 
governments, or SNGs. 
15 The first of the four questions, that of Expenditure Assignment has been adequately addressed by elsewhere (for 
Somalia, by Peteri, 2017), as have the topics on Intergovernmental Transfers and Borrowing and Debt Indeed, there 
is a large, yet due to data limitations, still more developing than robust, literature on all these topics. For  reviews  
with an African focus see Yatta and Vaillancourt (2010), Yilmaz and Tosun (xxxx), and Negussie/.HESPI (2016) 
Somalia (FGS) and its   Federal Member States (FMSs) work together to create an era of cooperative-
federalism (World Bank,  2015,  Sec 7.4).  16  
 
 
Schematically,  the organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows:  
 
<Fundamentals of Revenue Assignment> 
the policy asymmetry of   c losed vs.  open economies → 
finance follows function: establish a willingness to pay taxes and fees→ 
from broad principles to local applications → 
theory of the public  budget → 
the normative of “who should pay” taxes and fees?→ 
how this normative is  further shaped by spatial considerations→ 
  the revenue assignment matrix of which type of government 
is best positioned to utilize different types of revenues→ 





Universal Principles: The Preliminaries    
 
To set the stage for sequencing revenue reform, the following   two “preliminaries” must be considered: (i) 
revenue classification terminology; and (ii) the rationale for why the two assignment questions are taken in 
sequence whereby   “finance (revenue authority) follows function (expenditure responsibility).”  
Terminology 
 Getting “revenue assignment” right requires getting clarity on some on terminology. There are three 
terminology topics to be highlighted in addressing the revenue assignment question: (i) different types of 
revenues and the distinction between a   revenue and receipt; (ii) being explicit as to the definition of a local 
revenue; and (iii) why the Somali task is one of sorting out as distinct from assigning revenue authority 
among governments.   
Tax vs. Non-Tax Revenue.   
As an abstract economic matter,   the distinction between” “tax”   and “non-tax:  revenue is not much of a 
concern. Both refer to the setting of a revenue “price”   (also referred to as a “tax cost”) for the delivery of 
a set of public services.  
                                                                                  
16 The World Bank   identifies seven geographical groupings that might serve as part of an informal process of 
minimizing conflicts over state boundaries and the composition of interim FMS administrations. World Bank 
(2015), Sec 7.4. The seven are   Somaliland, Puntland,   Interim Juba Administration (the regions of Gedo, Lower 
Jubba, Middle Juba); Interim South West Administration (Bay, Bakool, Lower Shabelle), Interim Galmudug 
Administration (South Mudug and Galgaduud), Hiiran and Middle Shebelle, and, the Benadir Region.   
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However, in matters of accounting —for example, in developing a Somalia Census of Government 
Finances—one   must be careful to not use   terms “tax” and “revenue” interchangeably.   
Here, there   are two considerations. First, mixing up the terms may have implications for whether   the 
amounts collected from certain types of revenue are subject to legally imposed limitations. Thus,   in some 
countries   and/or member states there is a constitutional or statutory limit on the amount of a tax that can 
be collected and/or on the tax rate that a government can impose.  For example, in Benin, local governments 
may determine   property tax rates subject to a minimum and maximum range that has been determined by 
the Parliament. (Vaillancourt and Yatta, 2010, p.36).      
One response by a government that is so constrained, is to replace a tax with a non-tax revenue.  For 
example, consider the local government that that faces a limitation on the amount of property taxes it can 
generate; and at the same time still needs to provide road maintenance services.  If the funds for paying for 
this service are paid out of property tax revenues that are subject to a levy limit,   the funds may be 
insufficient to pay for the required repairs.  If, however, the   funding is derived from   a nontax revenue 
such as a “right-of-way fee” assessed on land and building that front on the streets, then the tax limitation 
is circumvented.    
Second, getting the terminology right at the outset will permit a meaningful comparison of Somali’s 
intergovernmental finances to that of other nation states. What is a “tax revenue”   in one country may be 
classified as a “non-tax revenue” in another. The payments for the use of heating and lighting utilities 
provide a good example. Some governments classify   the payments as a “utility tax”; others may classify 
the very same payment as a “utility charge”. 17   
A tax is a required -by-law compulsory payment to a government in order to   finance the provision of 
government services. (Bird, 1976; Thuronyi, 2005). Names for taxes are excise, impost, cess, levy, and, in 
the case of international trade flows, customs duties and tariffs.   
A tax may be “general” or ‘specific”. A general tax it is a payment made without reference to any specific 
benefits derived from government spending. The most common examples are the levies on personal income,   
retail sales,   and general business activities measured by the gross sales (receipts), profits (“company tax”), 
and/or value added of a business enterprise.  
Then there are “specific”   levies, again compulsory, on a person or group of people assumed to be the 
primary beneficiaries of certain public services.  Examples include levies the use of utility services, the 
purchase of motor vehicle fuels   and “selective sales/excise” taxes sales on “things’ such as food purchased 
in restaurants, luxury goods, amusements,   and hotel accommodations. Too, a specific tax may levied on a 
products or activity that, though legal,   society wishes discourage such as the use of alcohol.    And as in 
Kenya, specific taxes products such as tobacco or khat that exhibit a price inelasticity of demand whereby 
the quantity of the product used is not much reduced by the imposition of special tax with the result that it 
becomes a reliable revenue producer. 18  
                                                                                  
17 The classification of government imposed charges for the flow of utility services   tax in South Africa and as a fee 
in the United States. 
18 Technically: the increase in the percentage change in the specific tax is less that the percentage change in the 
reduced quantity demanded of the product. Thus, total revenue increases even though the quantity demanded of 
the taxed product decreases.   
A non-tax revenue –that is, a payment structured as a user fee or charge— is a payment to a government 
for which there is an explicit   quid-pro-quo for a service received. Some user fees and charges   are clearly 
voluntary payments—e.g.,   such as a sum of money paid by an individual who chooses to access   a   public   
museum,   recreational facility, or game park or   motor vehicle parking space; but, many fees and charges 
are   compulsory.  
With respect to the set of compulsory non-tax revenues, there are   two categories:   regulatory charges   
and infrastructure charges and fees levied for the purpose of financing the capital construction, and, once 
that infrastructure stock is in place, financing the maintenance and operations to pay for the continuing flow 
of infrastructure services (Bird and Slack, 2017).   
 Regulatory fees,   which may be central or state/ local tend are typically place-of- service specific. 
In nearly all these cases   those who pay for the service and be readily matched to those who use 
a service being supplied. Examples include:  payments   for documentary services such as land 
registration, marriage and birth registration, and passport issuance along with charges for market 
stall rental, slaughterhouse/abattoir use, livestock grazing rights, food inspection, and advertising 
on public properties.  .      
 In contrast to such regulatory fees, charges and in support of paying for cost of the public 
infrastructure services often have “polycentric” character    since infrastructure (e.g., roads, 
bridges, ferries, sewer and sanitation systems, solid waste disposal facilities, water and ports, 
inland waterways, hospitals and health clinics, schools, on-street parking spaces and parking 
garages,  facilities, game parks, publicly  assisted housing)  will be shared by/flow across  the 
boundaries of government jurisdictions.  
Financing the Capital Stock. In this case of paying for infrastructure, charges and fees may be 
earmarked either for financing new or improvements to the capital stock, or for funding the current 
flow of infrastructure services.  Although as countries  become more developed most of the capital 
financing of infrastructure is secured through the use of debt finance (e.g.,  Johannesburg, 2004-
2010;  Lagos, 2008-2010; Ouagadougou, 2006), there is  also role for some user charge financing 
such as that of a  (i) special assessment fees for publicly provides services charged to the property 
owners who live on-site along the infrastructure service (e.g.,  betterment levies for a city 
sidewalk)  and (ii)  and “exactions” and “impact fees” levied on  developers of an infrastructure 
project in order to help defray the cost of nearby, but off-the-development site, infrastructure that 
the public would otherwise have to finance (e.g.,  a  “feeder road” that provides access to a 
privately develop power plant  or charge for  using the public right-of-way to install a private 
telecommunications cable network).19  
Funding the Service Flow. The   primary role of   user charges in developed and developing 
economies alike  is that of funding current flow of infrastructure services—e.g. for   roads and 
highways (e.g., tolls, fees or taxes on motor fuel, and in some cases, motor vehicle licensing for 
both the vehicle and the driver); utilities (amount of the utility output used, and,   the 
aforementioned  use of a public right-of way), hospitals (e.g.,   fees for services at government 
                                                                                  
19 Paulais (2012). Chapters   
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provided health clinic); sea and port facilities (e.g., wharfage and harbor fees), and permits to use 
and/or extract natural resources (royalties).20 
Central vs. Local Revenue.   
 For a system of  federalism for which   an intended high degree   autonomy is to be accorded to the FMS 
and its   local governments,  having clarity between what constitutes a central vs. a state/local  “own” 
revenue is of considerable importance.  A  failure to have such clarity will undermine the very essence of 
fiscal federalism, which is to recognize that because of spatial considerations  different  types of government 
are positioned differently to deliver different types of public services in order to best deliver a total bundle 
of public services that most efficiently reflects citizen preferences and community needs.  In this regard, a 
potentially problematic matter for revenue assignment is to fail to distinguish between the   government 
that makes the payment for a public service from the government that made the decision to structure the 
taxes that fund that payment.  
What constitutes a central   revenue is generally straightforward: it is money that that is generated through 
a central government legislatively levied tax or non-tax fee/charge that is initially deposited in a central 
government treasury account.21 This is true even if for administrative (or political) convenience,     revenue 
collection is administered   state government (German länders, in Canada the asymmetric case of Quebec 
province and the oblasts of the former Soviet Union.) 
Local Own Source Revenue.    
A topic that merits further explanation is what constitutes a “local” (FMS) revenue—a topic that goes to 
the heart of the case for a   multi-tiered national revenue system of the form envisaged in the Provision a 
Constitution. 22      
Taxes for local (FMS) may be divided into categories of decreasing local autonomy (Table 1).  For a tax or 
fee to be considered a “local own source tax”   the FMS or its sub-state governments (municipalities, 
villages, districts) must, at a minimum, have the authority to determine rate of the tax or the level of the fee 
or charge. If this basic requirement of the ability to set  its “own” tax rate or level of the fee  at the margin—
that is, a rate/fee  that generates the extra shilling (Sh. So.) for local own use –is not met, then the revenue 
cannot be classified as a “local” tax or non-tax revenue.   One will note from Table 1 that this basic 






                                                                                  
20 The classification of government imposed charges for the flow of utility services   is sometimes classified as a tax 
(S. Africa) or as a fee (United States). 
21 For Somalia: Provisional Constitution of 2012, Article 125. 
22  This lack of clarity is   not limited to country   policy deliberations. Thus, the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
of the Intentional Monetary Fund are reported in a manner that lumps together as a subnational or local revenue 
both subnational receipts from tax sharing of central collections and “own" taxes and non-tax revenues (Ebel and 
Yilmaz. 2004).  
































SNG choses the tax base and set   
the rate.  The only revenue bases 
sources “off limit” are those for 
which the Center is guaranteed 
exclusive rights (e.g., customs 
taxes,   passport issuance, 
patents). 
Highest degree of own – source revenues.  Most often 
pertains to fees and charges.   E.g., in Rwanda the property 
tax and a wide variety of fees, business licenses and permits 
(Yilmaz, 2010).   Kenya, S. Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe 
also generally provide for tax base autonomy. However in 
these    five cases the central government has the legal 
authority to override local decisions (Vaillancourt and Yatta, 
2008). 
SNG sets tax rate only  Necessary and sufficient condition for categorization as 
“own revenue”. Under this arrangement the SNG conforms 
to the central tax base but retains the authority to set its 
own tax rate without limit (including the option to apply a 
zero tax rate). South African local governments have 
discretion over property tax rates (Bird and Slack, 2014). Tax 
rate autonomy for some local taxes without a central veto  
occurs in Benin, Niger, Malawi, and Mali (Vaillancourt and 
Yatta, 2010) 
SNG sets tax rate, but only within 
centrally permissible ranges  
A typical practice is to cap the top rate a local government 
may impose. Under this circumstance be efficiency gains 
from being federal are greatly diminished (Hungary 
turnover taxes and property taxes in Benin, Japan, Poland, 
South Africa, and Russia).  
Tax sharing whereby central/local 
revenue split can be only changed 
with consent of its SNG  
Can result when a local authority collects the tax and remits 
to the center.  Denmark’s Municipal Councils have   non-
legally binding   but well established formal arrangement 
with the central government “Tax Denmark” autonomously 
levy income tax surcharge.    
Revenue sharing with share 
determined unilaterally by central 
authority.   
100% control by center. E.g., Australia (VAT), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (total national revenues); Gabon 
(personal income tax); Senegal (motor vehicle taxes and 
other specific taxes); Nigeria.   VAT and mineral revenues; 
common in Central   and South East Europe.     
Central government sets rate and 
base of  “ SNG revenue”  
May accompany political decentralization  
  Source: Adapted   from (OECD/Jensen , 2001) and OECD/Blochliger and Rabesona, 2009. Also see Table 2.  
 
 
7/21/201810:54 PM  
Page 15 
The 35 member OECD countries generally accord SNGs a high degree of revenue autonomy, but there is a 
and a mixed record in Latin America (other than in the  OECD member federations  of  Argentina and 
Mexico), Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia, and South Asia (although India local authorities  set 
property tax rates subject to state discretion).   
In   Saharan Africa there are several examples of local autonomy,    Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania 
allow local discretion over the setting of property tax rates (Bird and Slack, 2004).  Rwanda local 
governments have full authority over their property tax rate and base   (and collection) as well as a high 
degree of own-revenue authority to levy fees (e.g., sale of animals, market fees, licenses and permits, and 
the setting of tolls on locally owned roads and bridges).  Yilmaz (2010).   
Shared Revenue 
 An important implication of the definition of an “own” revenue is that revenues that accrue to one 
government, typically a central government,    that are then “shared” in some manner (some percent of the 
total collections or by a formula) with other governments in an intergovernmental   system are not to be   
recorded as “revenue” to the recipient government that has no independent powers to affect those revenues 
(Martinez -Vazquez and Timofeev, 2005; Muwonge and Ebel, 2014). In this case of revenue sharing, the 
monies received are properly classified as an intergovernmental grant, which is a matter to be addressed 
when examining the third of the four fundamental questions listed above.   
Similarly, monies received by a government   derived from grants and loans are receipts, not revenues. 
Thus, for example, in   the case monies generated through of a loan (e.g., from the World Bank or other 
International Financial Institution)    are receipts,   which in the case of a loan or bond must be repaid and, 
thus (i) recorded in the government’s financial records as a    receipt when deposited in the local treasury, 
and   (ii) as an   expenditure when debt service payments are made.  This is why in listing of the   fourth of 
the four fundamental questions facing any intergovernmental society, the language refers to the   “the timing 
of receipts for financing the public’s capital”.   
Revenue “Assignment”  
 The use of the phrase revenue “assignment”   became widely used in the public finance literature in the 
1990s when the policy   focus was on that of the   fiscal decentralization of financial roles from historically 
strong central authorities to “their” local governments.23  It was a trend and a term that was (in still is) in 
appropriate use   in   Eastern and Central Europe, Eastern Asia, South Asia, and Latin America.   It is also 
a term that has crept into—indeed, still typifies-- much of the public finance literature.   (e.g.,   Tosun and 
Yilmaz, 2010; UNECA, 2010; Vaillancourt and Yatta 2010; Muwonge and Ebel, 2014, and Negussie, 
2016).   
The problem with the term is that it may imply to some that the   decision of “which revenues are most 
appropriate for use by which type of government” is a centrally determined “top-down” process.  In the 
case of a unitary governmental structure, this is just fine—indeed, just the right way to think about second 
                                                                                  
23  As Peteri (2017) details, “fiscal decentralization” encompasses three distinct arrangements or variants: 
Deconcentration or administrative decentralization whereby regional offices of central ministries are established in 
local jurisdictions for the purpose of the composition of local goods and services to be provided; delegation, which 
can be characterized as an principal—agent relationship among different type of governments   and devolution 
whereby  by independent local self-governments are established.  Elements of all three variants will occur with 
federalism  
of the four fundamental questions for an intergovernmental society.   But this is not the case for a federal 
constitution that accords   a high degree of fiscal sovereignty to the member states  
And,  on this   score,  Somalia has a chance to get it right.   Rather than declaring that the question that the 
determination of   “which   revenues are most appropriate for use by which type of government” is a 
matter for central government legislation,    the Provisional Constitution adopts language that is allows for 
a cooperative federalism: “the responsibility for the raising of revenue shall be given to the level of 
government where it is likely to be the most effectively exercised” (Provisional Constitution,  Artic le 50, 
para f).   
 
Thus,  other than  with respect to four areas revenue roles appropriately reserved   for the  FGS powers 
(foreign affairs,   national defense,  immigration,  and c itizenship) the  Provisional Constitution avoids 
specifying a checklist  of  rules of how financial resources will  assigned among types of governments,  but 
rather lays out a set of principles that envisage a process that opens of the opportunity for a knowledge 
–based dialogue  for developing  robust intergovernmental institutions to facilitate ongoing negotiation 
….”   (World Bank,  2015.  vi;  36-40; Peteri,  2017).  The Provisional Constitution   further allows pre-existing 
states (of which now Puntland is the only practical example) to exercise powers given by their state 
constitutions24,  25.      
 
Recognizing these caveats,  the phrases   “allocation of revenue authority”  and “revenue mobilization” 
may be interchangeably used refer to the   process of “revenue assignment”  throughout   the remainder 
of   this Note.    
 
Finance Follows Function.    
The four fundamental questions   are   sequential as well as intertwined.  Thus, the decision about the design 
of only one   of the four questions   may distort, or support,    the design of the other three questions (World 
Bank, 2015, 38).    With respect to the first two of the four—the “assignment questions”,   the   rule is that   
the decision of   which type of government will be responsible for providing which set of public goods and 
services (the function of government) should precede the determination of the    question of   which revenues 
to assign (finance).     That is, “finance follows function”.26     
There are two good reasons for the principle of     finance-follows- function… along with   a very important 
caveat. The first  goes to the matter of question of a citizen willingness to pay taxes—that policymakers 
cannot knowledgeably establish the required level of subnational revenues independent having a reasonably 
clear sense of the bundle of   services that citizens expect their governments to government to deliver. As 
phrased below, governments tax to spend.  
                                                                                  
24  World Bank (2015). p.36.  
25  There is a further  FGS/FMS sorting out dialogue needed  with respect granting FGS the role for carrying out 
traditionally accepted powers of a central state (e.g.,   maintaining an army, issuing visas, establishing customs 
barriers).  Peteri, 2017. 
26 Mclure, 1993; Balh and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005; Peteri, 2017 and others.   
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The second   is that ignoring the interplay between the finance follows function rule runs the risk of 
undermining one of the most basic responsibilities of government, which is to properly macro-manage the 
national economy.   
Governments Tax to Spend.  
The first, and perhaps such an obvious reason, that finance-follows-function probably does not need be 
mentioned—but then again, it obvious enough that it must said: government’s tax to spend.   
Unless  citizens see the benefits that accrue to them from paying taxes and fees, a critical element of the 
social contract that  allows a government to count on a willingness to pay for these services will collapse—
and, thus,    undermine the  public finance system as a whole.   
And, on this matter, Somalia has some work to do.  A review at the most recent data reveals a matter of 
concern for the FGS, which shows that 84 percent of recurrent expenditures are being spent on the FGS 
itself, either in form compensation of the central (federal)   government employees or its “use of goods and 
services”.27 To  date the FGS  has been able to finesse the need to make the link between spending and a  
citizen willingness to pay taxes by financing itself through  a combination of a (i)   trade taxes and fees that 
are largely paid by –exported to—non- residents and (ii) and donor grants.28    
But this arrangement may about to change. There is some recent survey evidence   that citizens are looking 
to the new government to do more than pay for its employees and office supplies. In January of this year 
the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies conducted a public opinion poll that found that 
there is a citizen demand for public services. The need for improved public safety (security)   led the list, 
followed by fixing “a broken education system” (nearly 70 percent   of children of school age are not in 
school), putting a national healthcare program in place (e.g., disease control, community health education 
and awareness programs, monitoring and regulatory capabilities), and job development (two thirds of the 
14-29 year old cohort is unemployed). 29    A related concern (not reported in the HIPS survey)  is that the 
FGS capital expenditures account for less than a half percent of GDP, a policy that if continued will 
probably guarantee it status as a fragile state.30   
The FGS current use of nearly all external funds to pay for itself combined with the rising expectations of 
its citizens and it’s remarkably low investment in providing an infrastructure for future consumption is a 
clear argument for quickly sorting out the expenditure and revenue assignment questions and moving just 
as quickly at establishing an intergovernmental revenue system.      
Macroeconomic Management.  
 The second reason for the finance follows function rule -to-follow-function rule is that getting the rule 
wrong can   lead to a significant   macroeconomic mess. Take, for example, the case of the   Colombian   
Constitution of 1991 that incorporated a provision for a rapid increase in the sharing of central revenues 
with local authorities to demonstrate the nation’s commitment to becoming functionally intergovernmental. 
                                                                                  
27 FGS MoF (2015) cited in World Bank (2015) Table 3.2. Total Recurrent expenditures ($US 184.5 m in 2015) 
accounts for 4.5% of GDP (excluding Somaliland).   
28 On average for 2012-14, 91 percent for of total tax revenue for 2012-14)  World Bank (2015), p. 16 
29 Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (2017); World Bank (2015). Table 21. 
30 The link between allocating current revenues for the purpose of paying for the public’s capital (infrastructure) 
and future economic growth is well established. In the economist’s jargon, society reduces its current consumption 
(saving) in order to ensure future consumption (investing). For a review see Paulais  (2012); Ebel and Prasad (2017)  
Despite the well-intended   nature of “top down” revenue assignment, that the   policy failed to re-assign 
spending   responsibilities from the center to the localities    culminated in excessive public debt, which 
then precipitated a private debt crisis.31     
Simultaneity in Assignment.  
The principle that that finance follows function is not contested here.  However, there is a corollary:  to the 
extent possible, make expenditure and revenue assignment decisions simultaneously.  Empirical results of 
cross-sectional analysis suggest that: (i) the simultaneous decentralization of a national government’s taxing 
and spending powers exerts a negative and significant influence on overall public sector size; and (ii) there 
is a payoff in terms of improving a nation’s macroeconomic performance.32    
 
 Universal Principles… From Theory to Practice 
 The Theory of the Public Budget in an Intergovernmental Society 
 
 The traditional analysis of public  f inance lays out a way of looking at the role of governments by examining 
three public  sector competencies,  each of which stems from the economics of private market failure.33,  34 
 
 The maintenance of full employment and price level stability  (stabilization). 
 The determination and attainment of an equitable distribution of income among its c itizenry.35  
(distribution of income and wealth,  which in an intergovernmental context refers to redistribution 
polic ies with respect to both people and places ) 
 The avoidance of a misallocation of the use of society’s scarce economic resources that results 
from certain ineffic iencies due to the operation of the private market system  (allocation). 
 
Clearly,  these   functions may overlap.  For example,  tax and fee financing of a highway road   project will 
re-direct resources from private to public  sector uses (allocation) and,  in the process,  redistribute   income 
                                                                                  
31 Ebel and Prasad, 2017. 
32 Ehadie, 1994; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2004; Boadway and Shah, 2013. 
33 Musgrave (1959 ); Others have argued for a broader model depending on the special circumstances of a system 
under change Bird, Ebel, Wallich (1995) note that in the Central European   “post-socialist” transition the functions 
of privatization of the state-owned-enterprise regime and the maintenance of the social and health safety net 
became key local functions.     
34 The sources of “market failure” whereby the private market-price system fails to efficiently allocate resources 
include e (i) good and services for which there is a demand but for which the exclusion principle does not apply 
(pure public goods); (ii) concentration of n of monopoly power; (iii) positive or negative externalities  (incomplete 
markets (spillover effects);(iv) incomplete markets (under supply of some goods for which there is a willingness to 
pay); (v) incomplete information, and (vi) macroeconomic disturbances. This topic is addressed Musgrave (1983);   
Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015), and others.    
35 The function of/responsibility for equalizing incomes by place—in the case of Somalia—across its geographic 
member states and regions—is the topic of the third of the four fundamental questions, which is how to structure 
a system of intergovernmental grants.   
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in favor of residents liv ing along and at the end of the transportation path (distribution).    If the project is 
very large it  may be a component of a centrally  funded job-generation effort (stabilization).  In addition, 
the method of f inancing   infrastructure (likely a mix of bonds,  special tax and revenue assessments,    asset 
sales and   external grants) may have another set of allocation,  distribution,  and stabilization effects.    
 
This stabilization-distribution-allocation breakdown provides a the basic  framework for addressing the 
fundamental questions of public  budget policy to be addressed in this Briefing Note—which type of 
government,  central or local—should be charged with the performance of each these three tasks? And, 
given that answer,  what type of revenues should be assigned in order to carry out the three roles of a 
public  sector? 
 
Underlying the answer to   both   questions is that of the   degree of   “economic openness”  of the 
governmental jurisdiction.  In a “closed economy”  whereby the central government has the legal authority 
and access to the regulatory rules that enables it to isolate (or,  at least,  buffer or control) parts of its 
economy from the rest of the world,    impacts of fiscal policy can be largely limited to the residents of the 
jurisdiction.    That is,  the “spillovers’  to neighboring nations of the benefits of   public  budget policy can 
be minimized.  Although no economy is fully  c losed,  especially  in this era of globalization,   a well-  
functioning national ( in Somali’ s case,  federal/FGS) government with the authority to restrict the flow of 
goods and services and the factors of production (e.g.,  labor,  capital) across its borders approximates this 
structure.    As a result,  the interjurisdictional factor and goods mobility within the nation-state   need not 
become a major consideration in key aspects of national budget policy 
 
However,  a crucial asymmetry exists for the making of budget policy in the member states of a federation 
due to the more “open” nature of their economies.  Unlike the well-  functioning central government of a 
nation state,  the member states in a federal society will not have the authority to legislate tariffs,  quotas, 
or license barriers to restrict the flow of goods and services   across their borders.  Nor,  will member states 
and their localities have the authority to constrain the interstate movement of the factors of production 
through migration controls,  capital controls,  foreign exchange rate policy and the like.   
 
Given this asymmetry,  the character of central vs.  member state budget policy changes.   One implication 
is that the stabilization and distribution goals are primarily  the concern of the c entral government.  A 
second is that this assignment of competencies leads to an important first step in the sorting out of 




Why Central (FGS) Tax Policy Matters  
 
Stabilization.  There are reasons why in a well-  functioning federal system,  the center rather than its 
constituent subnational units,  can best carry out stabilization polic ies.     The first follows from the open-
economy realty that subnational governments  will be  unable to effectively induce changes in their 
output,  employment,  and price levels through fiscal policy—the discretionary manipulation of own-
revenues and  expenditures.  Although    subnational   tax and spending policy may be directed toward 
local residents (e.g.,  a large scale public  employment program,  or an attempt to change the rate of   control 
the rate of change of the price level),    the stabilization effect within the jurisdiction will be greatly 
dampened   because markets (factor and product)  are so interrelated that spending leakages result.     
 
For example,  if a single FMS were to takes on the task of a “full employment”   program that reduces its   
rate of joblessness well below above its neighboring state,  one can not only expect an in-migration of new 
residents making the job search,  but also,  the see the spending of residents  leak across state borders. 
This is particularly true for Somalia which is both highly  consumption intensive (in 2014 household 
consumption was equal to 134 percent of GDP) and import reliant  (2014 net exports are a negative 47 
percent).  Thus,  for a given level of   state output,  the unemployment rate problem will re-emerge.   In the 
economist’s terminology,  the spending multiplier will be low (World Bank,  2015,  Fig 3.3).36 
 
The same fiscal policy frustration will occur if  a member state attempts to control price level (which is not 
the same as controlling the cost of liv ing).     Such a subnational attempt at fiscal policy would likely require 
the FMS will to either (i)  raise taxes to a such a level that it would lead to unemployment and/ or ( ii)  
engage in defic it spending,  which,  if  the debt is not well managed,    will a pose a threat to the sought-after 
price stability for FMS and FGS alike (World Bank,  DMPED,  2017).     
 
In contrast,    central government has a critically  important stabilization   partner – an independent   central 
bank that is designed to regulate the nation’s banking system control the supply of money and credit. 
This,  in turn,  can facilitate the center the ability to engage in defic it (or surplus) f inancing of its current 
                                                                                  
36  Recognizing this open economy reality does not  rule out the merits of a member state or its sub-state 
governments instituting a  local economic development strategy (e.g.,  infrastructure spending to enable private 
sector growth,  making the distinction between the public sector provision vs. of a public service production of a 
public service); nor does it suggest that the member state should  not become the agent of the central government 
for funding and implementing a national employment policy through a central-member state grant program.  
Indeed, there is good case for just such intergovernmental cooperation.   
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operating budget and thus,  more effectively   address than can   subnational governments cyclical shocks  
which are  typically  national in scope (symmetric  across regions).37,38 
 
But,  to be able to do carry out such countercyclical budget policy,  the center must be in a f iscal position 
to do so,  which,  in turn,  means it must have access to broad based revenue tools  such as a broad based 
tax on consumption (value added) and income (personal income,  including capital income and levies on 
business profits).39 
 
The second reason that stabilization policy is a central function is that   managing stabilization policy is   
similar to an insurance contract whereby the central authority agrees to the task of evening out income 
variations that result from regional or exogenous shocks.  It follows that the center is best suited to assume 
the risks of volatile revenue sources;  in particular,  taxes on natural resource exploration and exploitation 
(petroleum,  minerals,  fishing,  forestry) and the notoriously  capric ious   company tax on corporate net 
income (profits).    
 
And third,  there is the practical matter it is the center’s and the central bank’s job to coordinate on   foreign 
exchange policy.40 I t follows that the center must have control over international trade taxes.  Thus,  the 
authority to collect customs duties and c lear imports into the country becomes a central responsibility.    
 
Distribution.  As noted above,  there is both a “people” and a “place” aspect to a policy of the distribution 
of income and wealth among a nation’s c itizens.  
 
People.  When it comes to securing an equitable distribution of income among citizens who have different 
degrees an ability-to-pay taxes,  the central vs.  subnational div ision becomes less c lear-cut that that for 
carrying out the stabilization function.    However,  for   the same reason of the open nature of subnational 
economies,  securing a broad degree of fairness equity in the overall distribution of income among a 
nation's population largely becomes central responsibility.    This is not to say that a member state or its 
local governments will not have a role in poverty reduction.  Indeed,  the proximity of a state/local 
government local to the poor,  and familiarity  with and understanding of the institutional situations and 
                                                                                  
37 An independent central bank will not directly lend to the federal government (it’s up to that government do 
borrow and then manage that debt) nor does the presence of a central bank guarantee good coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policy (Boadway and Shah, 2009).   
38  This argument as well as the counter- argument made by some question a central role in controlling the money 
supply is addressed by Boadway and Shah (2009,  Ch.14)      
39 A further argument for central authority for implementing a value added tax stems from the need for one 
government to act on behalf the entire nation to deal with the complexities of tax administration    
40 Which is not readily accomplished with Somalia’s dollarized economy. 
hostile environs the poor inhabit in different regions and communities,  provide advantages to 
decentralized governmental units in designing and implementing antipoverty polic ies.  (Bird,  et.al,  1995; 
Rao,  2002).  The policy implication is that,  in the developing-country context,  the central government will 
(i) have to have the revenue tools to generate the resources for poverty alleviation programs as well as 
(ii)  be able to turn to    state and local governments to undertake program design and implementation.  41  
Again,  federalism as a cooperative venture.      
 
Places.  Once the new Somali becomes intergovernmentally  revenue capable,  two types of fiscal 
imbalances will emerge.   The first is a vertical fiscal imbalance   between expenditure and revenues 
among different types of government.  The vertical imbalance reflects the fiscal reality that,  as intended,    
central governments will have control of the nation’s most productive tax bases –e.g.,  the taxes on 
personal   and general business income.  The second,  which is already now the Somali case,  is a 
horizontal fiscal imbalance that occurs when the differences in expenditure needs and revenue-
generating ability vary across similar types of subnational governments since some jurisdictions are 
more revenue base rich and/or less need impacted than others.  The polic ies for addressing /adjusting 
for these twin fiscal imbalances,  which goes to the   third of the four fundamental questions facing any 
intergovernmental society,  is adequately disc ussed elsewhere (Abdullahi,  2017). 
  
Why Local (FMS) Revenue Policy Matters 
 
The Allocation Function.   The foregoing   discussion   leads to a focus the third of the three competencies   
of the public  budget— commandeering resources to paying for a public  goods and services ranging from 
health c linics and elementary/secondary education to picking up the garbage to arranging for police and 
fire safety (Peteri,  2017).   Getting the allocation competency right is the   raison d’être for the state/local 
role in revenue mobilization.   
 
The reason for the primacy of the state/local role in allocation competency stems from the 
“decentralization theorem”  that the set of governments c losest to the citizens can adjust budgets to local 
preferences in a manner that best leads to the delivery of a bundle of public services responsive to 
community preferences.  Subnational governments—the FMS and its localities—thus become the vehicle 
provide services to identifiable recipients until the tax price for those services reflects the benefits 
received (Oates,  1972).  To put it more casually,  but aptly,  the elected legislative bodies of Puntland and 
Somaliland will have far more knowledge of the public  service demands and how to supply and pay for 
those services than will the Somali national parliament.  It follows that to in order to be able perform this 
role for what they have been elected to do,  state/local offic ials--  subnational   governments-- must be 
                                                                                  
41  This is an example of the delegation variant of an intergovernmental fiscal system. (Peteri, 2017), 
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allowed to exercise own source taxation at the margin and,  too,   be in a f inancial position to do so.  This is 
why getting right state and local revenue autonomy matters to the success of a federal society.     
 
Who Should Pay?  Benefits Received 
Along with the decentralization theorem,  the benefits received   serves as a foundation for the effic iency 
and equity    gains that a well-  designed   system of federalism can provide.   In this context,  “effic iency” 
requires that revenue policy should be designed so that this who benefit from the provision of a flow of 
public  services are those who pay for those services.  This f its the public  economist’s broader concept of 
effic iency that occurs when a society is getting the maximum benefits from the use of its scarce resources. 
(Mankiw,  2015,  7e.).   As it turns out,  the benefits approach tends to be not only effic ient but also 
equitable.  Thus,  just as one who consumes a private good or service in the market place pays a market 
prices for that purchase,  the user of the public  service will pay a tax price.   
 
In a private market exchange where there is reasonable degree of competition among buyers and sellers 
matters,  the private market price mechanisms provides the effic ient   user/payor quid-pro-quo.    But, 
when one turns to how to collectively set tax/revenue prices,     spatial considerations come into play,  not 
only regarding the type of revenue  for a government to utilize but,  too which type of government is best- 
placed to utilize which revenue  
 
Though at f irst glance the matter of “which   government shall have the authority to raise which set of 
revenues?” may    appear overly complex,  if  the policymaker proceeds by applying the principle of spatially 
matching benefit areas to financing areas   and,  then,  having done that,  locally  applying the principle to 
the special f iscal architecture c ircumstances of Somalia,  things can work out rather well.    
 
To further sort this out,  consider the two classes of public  service benefits:    specific and general.  In each 
case the resolution of question of “which government” shall have the authority over which revenue 
source” comes down to the principle of matching those who benefit to those who will pay.   Thus,  when 
the match of the benefits of a public  service are largely ( if  not exclusively) derived largely  by the residents 
of an FMS or to an even smaller area with in an FMS,    the financing area should be state and/or local. 
However,  when the flow of services “spills over”    over local boundaries with there will be a case for tax 
base overlapping,  or concurrent revenue assignment among governments.  This benefit area   may so 
significantly cross FMS boundaries and/or be of such benefit-importance to the broader Somali population 
that there will be a concurrent federal role.  
 
In its most strict interpretation,  the benefit  principle dictates a reliance on user charges and fees.  Note 
that application of the benefits principle does not necessarily  require full cost recovery or the restriction 
of levying the tax or fee on only residents of the taxing jurisdiction.  This is because the   benefic iaries of 
the net f iscal benefits of a f low of subnational public  services may not reside in the tax or fee levying 
benefit area.17  In this case,  some of the benefic iary   charge (or tax) must be designed so that it can be 
shifted to the non-resident.    Take,  for example,  the visitor to   a Somali c ity who benefits from being able 
to use local streets and enjoy the other public  amenities of her/his v isit.  Now the task for the local council 
to come up with a set of taxes and/or fees that while legally  levied (tax impact) on all users of visitor 
activities such as lodging,  entertainment,  and restaurant meals,  will be effectively shifted on to the non-
resident (tax incidence).        
 
Specific  Benefits   
 
FMS and its localities.    As policymakers consider the imposition of a system of benefic iary charges,  a key   
consideration will be on how large a specific  a benefit area may be.  In most cases it will be   determined 
that fees and charges are   particularly  well suited for use by a state and local authority.   As Bird (1996) 
advises,  “wherever possible charge”.  Examples from sub-Saharan Africa include: 42 
   
 Fees charged for direct use of a facility or consumption of a service:  schools,  school text books, 
slaughterhouses,  utility consumption (electric ity,  water),  sewers and sanitation,   refuse 
collection,   bus terminals and bus terminal services,  rental cars,  funeral services and funeral 
service cars,  cemeteries  billboard and banner advertising,  garage services,  fire brigade 
services,  parking,  road and canal tolls,  entry fees to facilities such as museums,  stamp 
(documentary) fees,   sports facilities,  and parks,  motor vehicle tags and inspection,    motor 
vehicles including motor bikes and land cruisers,  right of way use (e.g.,  on telecoms) and road 
use  charges (which may be structured as a tax for example,  on motor fuel or other vehicle 
characteristics such,  as in Somaliland,  the value of the vehic le). 
 
 License fees paid for the priv ilege of an activity (business establishment,  driving permits,  
vehicle use,  and stamp fees to defray the cost of public  monitoring of an activity such as land 
transfer and titling).   
 
 The betterment lev ies  noted above that defray the  to pay for local infrastructure (measured 
by increases in land values consequent on the granting of planning decisions,  spec ial 
                                                                                  
17 The term "net" is stressed to indicate that those spillover flows (externalities) may be positive or negative. For 
the negative externality (the most obvious case is pollution), a tax or fee may be levied to reduce the net costs 
through reducing consumption or production. 
42 Some fees and charges listed here may be central in some countries.  
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assessments to cover costs for things such as sidewalk construction and repair,  and developer 
fees to finance both on-site and off-site infrastructure).18  
 
 
Central Fees and Charges.  When the service derives from the role of the central sovereign state,  the 
following examples   match centrally:   Fees for ( i) c learing customs;   ( ii)  patents and trademarks and (iii)  
passport issuance,  (iv) airport arrivals and departures;  (v) airline landing and slotting; (vi) ocean fishing 
permits;  and (vii)  food and drug safety inspections. 
 
Overlapping/Concurrent Charges.  Recognizing the multijurisdictional (polycentric) nature of 
infrastructure services that cross government boundaries,  user charge finance takes the policymakers into 
the realm of coordinating benefit areas,  including that  of developing regional (e.g.,  multistate or even 
international)  compacts for   revenue authority.  The charging for potable water services is a good example 
whereby the source—the supply—of water is typically  in a different location that the place of distribution 
to the final user,  who,  though distant from the supply area,  nonetheless benefits from water supply the 
provision and,  thus the costs associated with infrastructure planning,  construction,  maintenance,  and 
monitoring (Frank and Martinez-Vazquez,  2016; Ebel and Vu,  2016).  Now a water system-wide charge 
must be authorized for imposition by a multistate regional authority,  the center or the FMS (or the center 
or FMS that is acting as an agent for a regional authority).  The supply  charge may be   both a lump sum 
fee (capital cost recovery) and periodic fee (operating and maintenance) on the final consumer.    
 
But this is just the water supply factor.  Next comes the charges required to cover the cost of   distribution 
to the final user.   Now identifying   the benefit area is a  more straightforward matter since there is likely 
to be a c lear local character to the distribution function and thus,  the payment mechanism; e.g.,  a 
commercial and household connection fee complemented with a water use fee that may   vary with the 
(i)   amount of water consumed; (ii)     timing of use; and/or ( iii)  by property type or type of consumers 
(Bahl and L inn,  1992).     S imilar examples of having to sort out revenue assignment to satisfy the matching 
of benefic iary with payor include the supply and distribution of other utility services (telecommunications, 
electric ity),  the use of canals and other waterways;  mass transit,  and disposal of solid waste.      
 
 There are two final observations to be made   regarding special benefit charges: (i)   to the extent that 
quid pro quo relationship between user and payor eases the identification aspect of revenue 
                                                                                  
18 0n-site infrastructure, some of which may be part of the developer's own responsibility, includes public facilities 
constructed on or adjacent to an area being developed (roads, pavements, water and sewage distribution 
networks), Off-site infrastructure includes development-related arterial roads, schools, fire and police stations, 
parks, and museums, whether or not built on the developed area, 
 
administration,  this also solves the question of which government shall manage and monitor a service; 
and,  (ii)  quite apart from which government levies which fee,  there is also an educational merit of 
reminding the citizen that prices (costs) can be public  as well as private—that is,  the reason governments 
tax and charge is to address spending needs.  43   
 
Generalized Benefits  
 
More conceptually  problematic,  but easier to implement (administratively,  if not politically),  are the 
"generalized benefits" that can be related in a logical way to services received.  Thus,  there   is a rationale 
for FGS and well a FMS (and,  in some large area cases,  localities) for the broad-based taxation of the 
business enterprise on income or receipts:  using the business enterprise as a tax collecting intermediary 
serves as a  conduit for taxing indiv iduals wherever they may reside ( including nonresident factor suppliers, 
such as shareholders) for the benefit of local services accruing initially  to the business enterprise.  Now 
government services,  central and local,  are appropriately treated as a factor of production similar to land,  
labor,  and capital,  and their costs should be incorporated into the pric ing structure.  
 
The generalized case also arises for state/local broad-based personal taxation (PIT) if  it can be determined 
that the generalized benefits of local government spending  are related to one's improvement in 
production (income earned) or the ability to consume (income spent).  That governments create those 
taxable benefits are applicable for a central government (there is little controversy here) and,  in many 
situations,  a subnational entity  (for example,  employment-generating agglomeration centers such as 
Mogadishu,  Kismayo,    Bosaso,  and Hargeisa).  In the case state and /or local use of the a PIT,  unless there 
is some other reason to believe that benefits change more or less rapidly than income or consumption,  it 
is reasonable to rely on flat-rate taxes for financing generalized services (McLure,  1999).  Too,  for purposes 
of simplic ity and ease of revenue administration (both of which are aspects of effic iency),  there is merit 
to a harmonization (conformity) of the tax base across all PIT levying jurisdictions.    
 
For the central or state entity,  either a production (origin) tax,  such as those on personal income or payroll, 
or a destination approach is acceptable (  e.g.,   a FMS surcharge levied on top of the central VAT base). 
                                                                                  
43  What is not straightforward are the twin questions of and level of a charge. There are several options, the choice 
of which depends on both the nature of the activity for which there is a charge and administrative considerations. 
The design  (and, with that, the level) options include: marginal cost pricing (for the economist, conceptually neat, 
but hard to define and measure); average cost pricing (easier to calculate if, as with other design approaches, only 
financial costs are considered); multipart tariffs (in the simplest form, fixed asset charges, such as a connection fee 
combined with an additional fee for use of a system); and going-rate charges (or, perhaps more aptly, fiscal expedient 
whereby the degree of  user demand elasticity is captured). 
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However,  for the local (eg.  a sub-state urban area),   an additional inquiry is necessary,  because people 
may not work where they live.  If the benefits are most c losely  linked to the production or earning  of 
income,  the jurisdiction should opt for a production-base tax,  such as a tax on payroll levied where the 
employment occurs.  But,  if  the benefits from tax payment local spending are more likely  to be related to 
the public’s enabling of a destination market,    the policy design argues for resident-based income taxation 
and/or a sales tax.  Which is the stronger case? A priori,  "basic" local services (for example,  schools,  health 
c linics,  and neighborhood libraries,  maintenance of local roads and sidewalks,  and street lighting) are 
consumed by (benefit) those who live in,  rather than work in,  a jurisdiction.  This suggests that the FMS 
and its localities should stick to resident-based taxes on personal income and a retail   sales tax. 
 
Using the generalized benefits argument,  could a FMS end up with generalized benefits taxation on both 
production and consumption? Yes.  The production rationale follows from the business enterprise 
rationale,  the consumption from the tax-financed services to residents.  Indiv iduals have several roles as 
taxpayers:  factor suppliers;  income earners;  consumers;  and wealth holders.  44 Each role provides a “tax 
handle”. 
 
A similar benefits case can be made for local use of the tax on real property,  residential and commercial. 
Users of property,  owners and tenants alike,  are benefic iaries of a wide array of generalized local services 
for which specific  charges are either not feasible or adequate for cost recovery.  These services range from 
community public  safety and the judiciary,  to primary education and community health and sanitation.   
  
Further Spatial Considerations. Degree of Tax Base Mobility. 
 
As noted,    well-functioning FMS and its local governments are able to access some benefit tax bases more 
readily  than can a central government (some user charges,    retail sales taxes,  and real property taxes).45 
The FMS/ local  list includes revenues that not only tend to satisfy the benefits rule,  but also have the 
merit of being levied on activ ities,  and tax bases that are relatively immobile (real property and,  depending 
on the degree of resident or worker mobility,  payroll);  and for which the benefits of subnational services 
(expenditure assignment) can be identified.  A range of specific  taxes and fees that have already been 
identified above fit that criterion.        
 
The taxation of natural resources presents a special case.  Since natural resources  such as petroleum 
(including for Somalia the potential for off-shore exploitation) and mineral mining (feldspar,  gypsum,  iron 
                                                                                  
44 The imposition of   tax on inheritances or estates is not addressed here.  
45 Taxes on other forms of property (for example, an intangibles or wealth tax) are not well suited to open 
economy jurisdictions. 
ore,  kaolin,  limestone,   quartz,  silica sand,  tantalum,  tin,  and uranium)  are often location-specific,  they 
satisfy the tax base immobility guideline and,  thus,  a case for FMS and local taxation.46  
 
However,  other considerations argue for national taxation.  There are three.  First,  as noted above in the 
discussion of the center’s stabilization role,  natural resources revenues are notoriously  volatile,  thereby 
making it just the wrong revenue to rely upon for local government that must have tax certainty to pay 
for the “necessary” local public  goods such as water distribution,  heath clinics,  and preschool and primary 
education.  Second,  because an FMS    government cannot take on debt to the extent that the center can, 
the FMS a locality is not in a position to defic it f inance once there is a downturn in global prices of the 
natural resources and revenues plummet.  Third,  the equity argument against local taxation of natural 
resources is a  powerful one.  Since natural resources are typically  unevenly distributed across regions,  
assigning natural resources to local governments would generate subnational differences in f iscal 
capacities among jurisdictions.   
 
The assignment solution is one of concurrent,  but not necessarily,  tax base overlapping taxation: First,  
assign to the central government the role of broad based taxation of income or receipts generated by 
business firm that is extracting/farming/managing the natural resource; and then also  set up a state/local 
tax regime to   cover the costs of (i) controlling (and/or c leaning up) local environmental degradation and 
(ii)    building and maintaining a local off-site local infrastructure that services the natural resource business 
activity.       
________ 
 
A matrix that pulls together the forgoing discussion is presented in Table 2.    The presentation is different 
from the typical revenue assignment matrix that is organized by type of revenue (which,  for getting a 
quick first-glance at how revenue assignment might work can be useful),  and instead by following   text 
presentation is arranged so that one can readily  see the logic  of how the Universal Principles (reading 
down the left vertical column) serve to organize and illustrate Local Applications (reading across and then 
down the four columns).  The format further allows one to note practical illustrations of how different 
countries sort out (or,  in many cases agree upon) whether certain types of revenues are central,  state, 
local or   concurrent or overlapping (the column on the right side of the Table).  A special effort has been 
made to illustrate Sub-Saharan African practice.47 When using table to it is important to keep in mind that 
because of the Universal Principles/Local Applications format,  in “assigning” a type of revenue   among 
governments it is the principle that should prevail.   But,  this said,    there are cases whereby for   type of 
tax is inappropriate vis-à-vis one principle,   but acceptable considering another principle.   This does not 
mean that a revenue assignment cannot be,  and should not be,  made; rather that the principle that 
                                                                                  
46 www.faoswalim.org/.../geology-and-mineral-resources-somalia 
47 With the assistance of Ms. Nellie Wanjiku Gaithuma 
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justif ies the assignment of a particular tax —central vs.  subnational—should be applied with an awareness 
that  balance of competing,  or even,  contractor objectives must be considered.  .    
 
To take an example: in going through Table 2 it is c learly  noted (and also in the text) that for purposes of 
macro-stabilization policy (e.g., ability of a government to engage in countercyclical f iscal policy)    
assignment of a    broad based general business tax on business enterprise (e.g., taxes on gross receipts, 
value added,  VAT,  business net income (profits)  to a FMS is inappropriate.  Thus,  for example,  the VAT 
should be assigned to the FGS.    
 
However,  when one then considers the principle of benefits received,  then the case for an apportioned 
FMS general business tax is quite c lear.  There is not an inconsistency or contradiction here.  What is being 
said is that for reasons discussed in the text,  the FSG must be the primary/most intensive user of the tax, 
but that for reasons of tax base accessibility an FMS should certainly  also turn to general business taxation 
and   in the interest of ease of revenue administration and minimization of taxpayer compliance costs 
consider a the approach of an FMS imposed “own-source” surcharge that conforms to the FGS base.  















Revenue Administration     
 
Just as the tax assignment sequence is a  way of thinking log ically  about how to go about the job of   
resource mobilization in an intergovernmental society,  so,  too,  is that   of sorting out revenue 
administration functions for Somali federalism.  Thus,  it is not too early in this historical Somali process to 
be simultaneously  thinking about the question of which government,  FGS or FMS should collect the 
revenues.  48,49 
  
Why Revenue Administration Matters  
 
There are three reasons why as   paying attention to,  and getting “right”,  the revenue administration 
process matters.   The first is    that to address only the topic of   revenue assignment topic  begs the 
question of how to collect the assigned revenues,  which,  of course,  is why one goes through the 
assignment sorting out task in the first place.    
 
The second is that “tax administration is tax policy”—that is,  although it appropriate to   f irst focus on the 
questions of intergovernmental assignment tax policy,  it is a lso the case that well how the tax is 
administered can determine the extent to which the intended policy outcomes are accomplished 
(Casanegra de Jantscher,  1990).    Once a Parliament or Legislature drafts and then approves a tax law,  tax 
administrators step in:   ( i)   writing the a rules and regulations to implement the law (ii)  identify ing and 
registering the taxpayer;  (iii)   notifying taxpayers of their tax obligations; ( iv) setting up a taxpayer 
assistance  facility;  (v)  sending out the tax bill while,  inter alia,  having to consider what to do if  there is 
not a reliable postal and   street address system; (vii)  establishing  tax payment/collection mechanisms; 
(viii)   establishing a payment process;  ( ix)  enforcing the tax payment obligation; (x)  setting up a taxpayer  
appeal process;  (x)  putting in place internal and external audit  regimes,  and (xi)  coordinating with the 
offices of the Budget,  Treasury,  and Comptroller to producing on schedule a required set of f inancial 
reports to the satisfaction of credit rating agency experts and the  taxpaying public  alike.     
 
The third reason why the topic of  how revenues are implemented   matters is that   revenue administration   
is  not only key minimizing the costs of taxpayer compliance,  but also about creating a “tax culture” 
whereby   c itizens have confidence  that the process effic ient,  uniform,  and free of corruption.  Why? 
                                                                                  
48 On   terminology: for purposes here the terms “tax administration”, “revenue administration” and a system for   
system for “tax collection” are used interchangeably.    
49 Further on terminology: recognizing that in the Somali federal system local governments are chartered by the 
state (FMS), a reference to FMS revenue administration is made with the understanding that such reference may 
include local government administration.   
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Because when it all comes together,  for a fiscal system work requires a high degree of voluntary c itizen 
taxpayer compliance (Cyan,  Koumpias,  and Martinez-Vazquez,  2016).     
 
Which Government Should Administer Which Set of Revenues? 
 
In establishing an intergovernmental system of revenue administration,  several critical questions arise  for 
Somali’ s to sort out.  50 These include: is there a sequence for addressing the components of revenue 
administration listed above—that is,  what is the priority when everything is a  priority? How does Somalia’s 
revenue architecture—its demographics,  economic base,  institutions (private and public),  and access to 
technology—shape what makes will “work”? Will there have to be “presumptive” set of taxes,  charges 
and fees to complement tools that typically  apply to a formal and relatively easy to tax economy? How 
can costs of collection and operation be measured,  let alone managed? What is the nature of the tradeoff   
between the accounting cost argument that   tax administration design should implemented to minimize 
the      costs of   operation   1985 vis-à-vis   the implic it,  difficult to measure and yet very important costs  
of a loss of  political and social accountability that may result from a cost accounting focus?    (Vaillancourt, 
Clemens,  Palacios,  2008; Martinez Vazquez,  2010; Commins and Ebel,  2010). And,  as it  embarks on 
building its organizational capacity to become a function federal state,  what can experiences of other 
nation-states can Somalia draw on to inform the intergovernmental arrangements for administering 
revenues?  
 
The focus of this discussion is on the last of these five questions.   As with the preceding sections on 
revenue assignment,  the purpose here is to take a first Somali-relevant look at  international  practice 
with a special focus on the question of whether an activity,  is this case revenue administration,  should 
become a central,  state ,  local or concurrent task.   
 
Universal Principles,  Once Again 
 
 For a start to look into this topic,  there are four   “overarching”  findings that emerge from international 
practice and “fit”  with the revenue assignment discussion (Bird,  2015.) 
 
 The questions of   ( i)  “which type of revenues are appropriate government” and (ii)  “which type 
of government shall administer which taxes”  are related but separable.    
                                                                                  
50 Questions, some of which Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev note have received far too little attention (Martinez-
Vazquez and Timofeev, 2010).      
 As is also the case for addressing the all four of the fundamental questions facing any 
intergovernmental society (page 4 of this paper),  there is “no one-size-fits-all”  right answer to 
choosing between central vs.  subnational revenue administration.  
 Recognizing the content of these first two findings does not imply that one that there are no   
lessons to be learned addressing the question of “which government administers”.   
 Just as with federalism generally  (as noted above,  Watts 2008) “getting right”  revenue 
administration will be a work in progress.  Although are guidelines for a well-designed and well-
implemented system of revenue administration,  what may make sense in one era may not be the 
right way for another time.     
 
 
Centralized vs.  Decentralized Administration  
 
International practice reveals several models of how governments sorted out the intergovernmental 
structure of revenue administration.  Four models are illustrated in Table 3.   
 Fully  Centralized Administration,  which may,  or may not,  be accompanied by SNG revenue 
autonomy;  
 Independent Tax Authority whereby each type takes on the role of administering its set of own-
legislated revenues;  
 Decentralized Administration where the federal member state serves as an agent for collecting 
its own revenues as well as all or some centrally  legislated taxes;   
  And systems that can best be described as an asymmetric  mix    each of the three types bulleted 
above. 
Also as with Table 2,  the format of Table 3 is designed to   focus on (i)  federal systems but,  too,  with 
appropriate references to unitary arrangements and (i) the type of tax practice (in this case, 
administration rather than assignment) rather that organize the topic on a tax-by-type of tax.    
Centralization of Revenue Administration  
 For countries that functioning central government and central government tradition,   the    minimization 
of cost-of- administration approach is often (but as one will see in the case of China and Germany,  not 
always)  c ited as a decision in  favor of  some form of central revenue administration.    
 A core  argument is  that there are  cost-minimization merits a centralized system that allows one to take 
advantage of  economies of scale and scope that  range from   drawing on overhead-spreading activities 
bulk purchasing of supplies and equipment (scale)   to being able to have in one place a large,  well trained 
technical staff  that can collaborate on related tasks (scope).  51  The case for centralization further goes to 
                                                                                  
51 Clearly there may be other that cost factors at play.  These range from the factors such as a continuing tradition, 
or on some cases, the legacy,   of command and control political systems (notably, for Africa,   including post WWI 
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the merits of reducing costs of taxpayer compliance—e.g., reducing the number of points of f iling and 
other regulatory contacts between taxpayer and tax administrator (a “one-stop  taxpayer window”).  
There is also the argument that centralized administration that the tax agency can best institutionalize 
anti-corruption offices.           
Decentralization to State/Local administrations 
 The argument that smaller can be better   recognizes the merits taking advantage of features such as 
overhead cost-management.   But   the then argument proceeds that having a tax office that is   c loser to 
the taxpayer and taxpayer c ircumstances reduces other indirect ( including implic it) costs that will occur 
by having the taxpayer have to deal with a  revenue offic ial in some distant large bureaucracy.   Factors 
c ited include the advantage of local tax officers having local knowledge of a   revenue base and the   unique   
profiles “their”    the taxpayers.52  
There is also the argument that in with decentralized   operations   c itizens can more readily  recognize 
and address and corrupt administrative practices—the same merit asserted for pro-centralization,    but 
with a two different “twists”  The first is that c itizens tend to pay much closer attention to how their local 
government is operating,  and when it v iolates certain social norms,  they can more easily  polit ically  
organize  to control those practices (Smoke and Taliercio,2007)  The second,  which is a combination   of 
the expedient and practical  a bit perverse,  is that    it is can be more difficult to c lean up a large central 
bureaucracy than it will be to “fence off”  one of many state/local bureaucracies.(for a  review of the 
corruption literature,    see Boadway and Shah,  2009)   
Making the Choice of Which Government Administers  
So,  which works “best”,  central or state/local?  It depends on the presence and interplay of many 
organizational,  institutional,  and human resource variables.  To recognize this—that there are 
complexities-- does not make making the choice an   insurmountable task.  Just for a start for Somalia to 
consider:  it may make sense for the FGS to make as one of its priorities the setting of   up of a bureaucracy 
to structure and administer one of the most important and generally agreed upon of centrally assigned 
taxes,  the   value added tax (VAT).   ,  which,  among other things,  entails tracking nationwide activities such 
as the proper filing of multistate credit and invoices and the imposition of border tax adjustments . 
Similarly,  a case can be made that since the Constitution makes international trade policy is a central 
government competency,  there is merit in further customs tax administration.   
However,  when it comes administrating of a c learly local tax base such as the property tax, a retail sales 
tax,  or the range of user fees for funding the current flow of infrastructure serves to locally  owned public 
assets (e.g.,  local roads,   utility service distribution agencies,  parks and recreational facilities),  the tilt is 
will be largely state/local.    
                                                                                  
colonialism) to efficiency consideration of   (small) geographical size and population density.  There are also similar 
non-cost accounting decentralization of administration factors again including geography size    and population but 
also the nature of a nation state that is fragmented due to variables such as ethnicity, language, religion,  and the 
urban vs. rural mix (Bird and Ebel, 2007). For a checklist of   revenue centralization “pros and cons” see Mikesell, 
2007. 
52 The topic of the role of traditional authorities in revenue administration is not addressed here. For a discussion 
of how traditional authorities function as local governments, see Jackson and Marquette, 2003 and   UNECA, 2007.  
 In addition there is the fiscal  autonomy argument that if  one type –of-government agency (centralized 
or decentralized) is tasked  with collection of revenues for  another type of government,  that there may 
be an  incentive for the tax administrator to make a greater effort to collect “ its government’s”  revenues.  
Mikesell  characterizes the Soviet Union  during the transition as having dual administration: while the tax 
inspectors were offic ially  and organized as part of the central government (deconcentration),  the local 
field staff had an incentive to be responsive to the interests of the local authorities that provided them 
office,  heat,  and supplements to their salaries.   One result was that regional authorities received cash and 
the central government in Moscow received an in-kind payment that was arbitrarily  valued.   This   
illustrates the incentive problem/question:  will revenue administration efforts be when proceeds of that 
effort go to another government treasury?  (Mikesell,  2007). 
 As for the “one –stop-window”  arrangement for easing compliance-- it can cut either way.   The typical 
Scandinavian practice opts for the centralized administration.   That works for the Scandinav ians.    But    
the same one-stop arrangement fits the   decentralized approach in the case of Germany.    
_________ 
The task ahead for Somalia is to sort out the “ it depends” by taking into account several factors ranging 
from the (i)  type of revenue to be administered (eg.  VAT vs.  the real property tax );   ( ii)   ability to take 
advantage of  institutional lead of the already established   revenue administration capacity of Puntland 
and Somaliland,  and (iii)  a cooperative recognition by all that although will take some time for the  FSG to 
become fully  revenue administration capable,  there are potentially  significant payoffs to be had for FGS 
and FMS alike..   
Regarding this last point ( iii)  above,  consider the experience,  and evolving progress of,  revenue 
administration in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina.  (World Bank,  2015; Fox and Wallich,  2007; Wallich 
and Zhang,  2013).   With the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Dayton Accords, 1995),    the confederal 
state Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was established with a fiscally  weak single sovereign State of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and two sovereign   “entities”:     Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.   Under the terms of the Accords,  the   State of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
provided with no independent tax sources,  thus having to rely on intergovernmental grants from the two 
entities.  The immediate post-Accords era was a fiscally  tense one; but overtime the confederation has 
become to look a bit more federal.  A harmonized customs law was adopted in 1998,  followed in 2001 by 
legislation for harmonized excises taxes and a sales tax.  Then,  in January   2006 with the introduction of 
a centrally  assigned VAT,  the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina single tax administration,  the Indirect Tax 
Authority,  was established (World Bank,  20150.  Attesting to Kornai’ s axiom (1956) that a   change in a 
government is not a change in a system,  but merely a pre-condition for a historical process,  the BiH 
experience suggests something very important for Somalia:  sorting out and implementing 
intergovernmental f iscal arrangements can serve as a bridge to functioning federal system      
 
Coordination and Cooperation 
And,  on this whole matter of revenue policy-meets- revenue administration,  one further observation is 
merited:   the making the choice between FGS, FMS or an overlapping/ cooperative    system of revenue 
administration is not an   ”either/or”    zero sum game.    Vertical (FGS and FMS) and horizontal (FMS to 
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FMS) coordination of tax  administration is the norm in many in federal systems.   Indeed,  the effic iency of 
tax administration will suffer if  independent   tax authorities do not coordinate Martinez-Vazquez and 
Timofeev,  2010).   The types  of administrative coordination,  which can  reduce costs of both tax 
administration tax compliance for FGS and FMS alike ,   includes ( i)  the sharing knowledge on common 
problems,  old as well as emerging; (ii)  trading information of innovative practices (e.g.,  from e-filing to 
how to deal with the hard-to-tax informal economy); (iii)  joint auditing of taxpayers whose operations 
cross state and/or international borders;  (iv) tax base harmonization that   preserves meets the tests of 
own-source revenue autonomy;  (v) taxpayer identification (e.g.,   common taxpayer identification 
numbers),    (vi) joint research including cooperation in  developing of revenue estimating models,  and for 
some revenues,  especially  the property tax,  (vii) tax base valuation and assessment administration.     















   
Table. 2. Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government:   Principles and Applications 
 Universal Principle/ 
Rationale 
Revenue Instrument Central (FGS) State (FMS) Local (Sub-State) Further Notes 
 
Macroeconomic  Stabilization   
 Broad Based Tax on Business 
Enterprise 
   
Value Added Tax (VAT) 
  
Gross Receipts , Turnover 
Tax(GRT) 
 
It is essential to assign   
broad base taxes   to 
implement 
stabilization and 
distribution.   
 State and substate (local) government 
use of these taxes are not justified as 
tools for stabilization policy; indeed use 
by an FMS and its substate entities may 
be cyclically perverse.   
 
    
Worldwide:   assignment of   broad based 
taxes on business receipts (GRT, VAT) to 
the Center. African examples include VAT: 
Botswana, Cameroon, Cape –Verde, 
Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial, 
Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe ; 
GRT: Ethiopia; Rwanda;  Profits (𝝅): 
Ethiopia, S. Africa, Uganda  All but one of 
the OECD countries assigns a VAT to the 
central governments. (US, taxes  𝝅 only )     
Corporate Net Income 
(profits, 𝝅 ) 
Because   central can 
engage in deficit 
finance, the center 
best positioned utilize 
due volatility of 
revenue yield.  The 
ability engage in 
countercyclical deficit 
finance   also pertains 
to VAT and GRT. 
 Broad Based Tax on  Personal 
Income      
Personal Income Tax      On residents and 
nonresidents alike; 
include capital income        
Sub-Saharan African countries include:  
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, S. Africa, 





Natural Resources  (e.g.,  
minerals, petroleum, forestry, 
water supply) 
Taxes on Revenues 
derived from exploration 
and extraction of   
products arising from the 
  Natural Resource 
exploration and 
extraction; royalties   
Not generally applicable except in the    
case where FMS and Local property 
taxation become appropriate in areas 
where the exploration and extraction 
 Note that with petroleum production 
countries often enter into a cost of 
production   sharing arrangement rather 
than institute   a tax regime (Sudan). 
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sale of mining, petroleum, 
forestry). These tax bases 
may be shared with an 
FMS under a broad based 
business tax regime 
occurs, especially if the local 
environment is damaged (Sudan in 
disputed areas of S. Sudan). Also (i) 
FMS/local tax and fee policy for paying 
for   costs (capital and O & M)   for  off-
site related infrastructure (e.g.,  roads, 
water and sanitation) and (ii) share of 
central  royalty  income base (SNG   sets 
the rate).      
Adoption of a central tax regime keep 
available the option for   some form of SNG 
taxation of the exploration and extraction 
process.     
  
Table. 2  Continued  Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government:   Principles and Applications 
 
   Universal Principles/Rationale    Revenue 
Instrument 
Central (FGS) State (FMS) Local (Sub-
state) 
Further Notes 
Role of The Central “Sovereign” 
 International Trade  Customs and Trade Taxes 
 
Central best suited to keep national border 
integrity 
 Not an appropriate 
FMS revenue.  However,    
Puntland and 
Somaliland employ a 
wide set of customs and 
trade (tariffs) taxes.   
  Worldwide: nearly always an exclusive 
central role.  How to sort out the customs 
and trade tax authority between the FGS 
and FMS will be a matter to be sorted out 
as Somali federalism becomes 
organizationally and institutionally 
capable. When/if the FMS vacates these 
tax bases the FGS will have to consider 
compensatory payments as part of the 
Intergovernmental transfer system (grants 
and /or a shared revenue arrangement)  
User Fees  Passport issuance;   immigration registration 
and fees; patents and trademarks, copyright 
fees, fees for use of central land, mail delivery 
charges.  
 Not applicable.    
Protecting the Commons Effluent Fees; Carbon and other Taxes 
Environmental Taxes.  The open, globalized 
economy calls for the cooperation of central 
governments (and, as  appropriate, their 
regional and global partners) 
Though the centre must take the lead in environmental protection due to the 
economics of closed vs. open economies,   to the extent that an FMS and/or its locality 
can identify a local source of environmental damage, there is an FMS Role   for adopting 
and “own” environmental   tax and fee policy.   
 
Distribution:People  (vertical 
equity) 
Entire set of central revenues regardless of 
source.  Access to broad based taxes on 
business and personal  receipts & income 
essential 
  
[the degree “fairness’  of  revenue incidence---how revenue payments are distributed 
across household/individual income classes-- while an important policy 
implementation matter,  is not part of the revenue assignment question]  
Distribution: Places/ (horizontal 
equity across jurisdictions). 
Entire set of FMS 
revenues if the FMS 
Not 
applicable 
In some cases (e.g., Pakistan) the 
intermediate government may serve as 
 
7/21/201810:54 PM  
Page 39 
Equalization may be part of a 
transfer system goal.  
establishes a state→ 
local aid program 
the center’s agent to develop a 
state→local  aid system  
  




Revenue Instrument Central (FGS) State (FMS) Local (Sub-
State) 
Further Notes and Illustrations  
 
Benefit Principle  
Specific Benefits other than 
for infrastructure services.    
Not-tax revenues (user 
taxes and  fees  employed 
as revenue producers as 
well as to adjust for  
spillover (e.g.,  
environmental) effects; 
selected sales (excises)  
Motor Fuel Taxes; 
Carbon and other taxes 
on use of the 
environment (e.g., 
effluent fees); use of 
central govt.  land 
(Rwanda), game and 
other national parks 
and reserves (Kenya)  
Yes: principle of   wherever possible levy 
charges/beneficiary fees on users of 
state and local services. Fees range from 
use of library services and care for the 
elderly   to access to judicial services and 
fire protection.   S. Africa law includes 
more than 125 user charges and fees 
(2015/16). Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda 
also employ a long list of fees and 
charges 
 
There may also be fees that overlap, but 
are not harmonized with, central levies. 
E.g., a variety of charges on motor 
vehicle use, care for the elderly, food 
quality inspection, and court fees.  A lack 
of harmonization of the tax/fee base will 
likely occur   since the central/state/local 
benefit area will vary spatially and by the 
demographic profile of the users.  
Kenya single business application tax and 
license fees, market and slaughterhouse 
fees, school nursery and   matatu   fees. 
Uganda and Ethiopia also turn to   market 
and stall fees.  Rwanda includes fees for 
billboard advertising   Puntland utilizes (i) a 
series of registration fees on businesses 
including   stamp/documentary fees& 
taxes; (ii)   taxes on transfer of ownership of 
intangible assets; (iii) rental of property 
vehicles and vessels; and (iv) registration of 
vehicle rentals. 
____ 
 Local governments in some country levy   
“terminal taxes” on goods, vehicles or 
passengers entering or leaving   the 
jurisdiction.     
Infrastructure:  Capital 
Revenues 
Betterment levies, special 
assessments, developer 
exactions that may be for 
both on-site and off-site 
construction  
Yes.  When 
infrastructure services   
cross state and 
international 
boundaries (e.g. 
national roads; water 
supply systems).    
Yes. When services are state (local) 
supplied: state (local) levied user 
charges. Betterment levies, special 
assessments, developer exactions for 
both on site and related off-site 
infrastructure.     
   
Infrastructure services—e.g., school 
building, hospitals, highways/roads, rail 
systems, sewers and sanitation, solid waste 
collection, treatment, disposal parks and 
recreation entrance. When the service 
being charged crosses local jurisdictions   
overlapping/coordinating fees and charges 
has merit.  In some countries there are 
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Infrastructure: Current Flow 
of Infrastructure services  
 There are two steps to 
the revenue sorting out 
process:  first, identify the 
mode to be financed and 
funded and, second, the 
type of beneficiary tax or 
(most likely) fee/charge to 
be associated with each 
mode.   
Illustrations, the application of which   will depend on the spatial 
matching of the user of the flow of services to the user cost of 
operations and maintenance. E.g., school buildings   (tuition); 
highways (tolls); airports (taxi service access); parking facilities 
(which with new technology can be peak-load priced). S. Africa 
levies charges related to the use of electricity, water, sanitation, 
and removal of refuse.      
multi-jurisdictional joint service districts 
and/or multi-state revenue compacts for 
which taxes and fees are coordinated and 
accessed (Peteri, 2007).        
  
Table. 2  Continued  Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government:   Principles and Applications 
 
Universal Principal/Rationale Revenue Instrument Central (FGS) State (FMS) Local (Sub-
State) 
Further Notes and Illustrations  
 
Generalized Benefits  
Broad Based Business Taxes  Taxes in value added, net 
income (profits), and 
Gross Receipts.   
The key   rationale for 
Central government 
use of these levies 
derives   from there 
stabilization and 
distribution roles; not 
from application of the 
benefits principle. 
 An    appropriate FMS 
tax handle. For 
simplicity, merit in 
conforming (typically 
via surcharge) to the 
Central Base, if there is 
one;  apportionment of 
the tax base required to 
reflect the FMS share of 
the total tax base 
(which may or may not 
be multi-jurisdictional) 
 Large cites 







of the tax base 
is required.    
Ethiopia (turnover taxes and a VAT) 
Puntland: (i) Agricultural income tax; (ii), 
tax on profit from resident industrial, 
commercial, vocational activities including. 
 
There are several ways to coordinate a 
central VAT with use by SNGs, Bird, 1993; 
Lee 92004); Keen, 2005; Le Duncan, 2012). 
Building a fiscally capable center need not 
require  FMSs to abandon their VATs ; 
although how its structure  may change in 
order to harmonize with a central VAT     
Personal Income Taxes    Resident based tax;  tax 
compliance simplicity is 
promoted if the tax base 











 Puntland levies an employer collected tax 
on wages and salaries (Pay-as-You-Earn), 
and capital gains, as well as income (net of 
depreciation)    on real or presumed 
income from use of buildings or other 
permanent structures. Somaliland levies a 
PIT on 6% of gross income and 10% on net 
capital gains.  
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Table. 2   Concluded. Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government:   Principles and Applications  
Universal Principal/Rationale Revenue Instrument Central (FGS) State (FMS) Local (Sub-State) Further Notes and 
Illustrations  
 
Immobility of the Taxable Base 
  General Revenues   Property Tax (land and 
land and Buildings) 
Cooperative federalism 
argues that the center 
taxes the mobile tax 
bases (which SNGs 
cannot effectively tax) 
and avoid /vacate   tax 
bases that have then to 
have clearly immobile 











Note that in the 
column to the left in 
the box on taxing 
Based on both the benefits and mobility tests, local (sub-state) 
governments should have the first-claim on property taxation; 
however, there may be a state role if a case can be made that 
some state services are particularly well related to property 
Ethiopia also has 
rental tax on land 
and residential 
house; Puntland 
Somaliland an flat 
rate tax on rental 
income from 
buildings” or other 
permanent 
structure: oncome 
tax on  Rwanda on 
land lease 
 Data shows “subnational” for Land and property taxes in 
Puntland and Somalia;  (World Bank, 2015); building and fence 
(Ethiopia)’ Property Tax (S. Africa); a classified property of 
differentiates on types of property(Kenya); state legislative 
power and local administration of a property tax (Nigeria)  
Single Stage Retail  Sales 
Tax 
  
In some cases, the base (the value of the sale) is readily 
identifiable, if even at the start it entails a rudimentary 
collection process (e.g., a common payment window at a 
market place where there are receipts or electronic registers).  
What will make the tax less workable will be the presence of an 
informal “underground” market sector.  In this circumstance, 
presumptive taxation should be explored.     
    . 




Yes on natural resource extraction where (i) royalties can be shared; (ii) a local tax on 
real property is in place (there is no a prior reason to exclude any commercial activity, 
including natural resource extraction), and (iii) environmental damage is evident.  
The taxation of   the intermediate transactions of whole sales and manufacturing sales 
can be problematic as the tax will be easily avoided by the firm that vertically integrated 
with firms operating in the other stages of the extraction   , production and distribution 
process. Ethiopia SNGs may levies an excise tax on locally manufactured goods and a 
turnover tax on services.   
Special Selected Sales 
(Excises)   including motor 
vehicle and vessel fees 
and taxes.    
intermediate stages of 
production,   natural 
resource extraction is 
not included. This 
revenue base is 
included above 
(unevenly distributed 
tax bases) as a central 
revenue.  
 
   
Overlapping shared/tax bases: Hotel and 
other visitor taxes; motor vehicle and 
vessel registration; tobacco, alcohol, soft 
drinks, bottled water.      
Text: wherever possible, apply specific user 
fees and charges.  For FMS and its localities, 
the matching principle and tax base 
mobility meet. 
Specific Revenues including a 
fee or tax that may be 
earmarked for specific 
purposes.  Kenya labels these 
as Cess Receipts  
Livestock   May be central or FMS; or overlapping or shared revenue bases; the tax base 
immobility suggests state and local application on livestock and agricultural 
products.    
Kenya levies a cess at different 
rates   on charcoal, livestock, maize, 
miraa (Khat), potatoes, sugar cane 




Table 3. Illustrations of Significant Features of Revenue Administration 
Country or 
Region 
Non-Revenue  Profile 
Note 
Description  
Baseline Somalia Nascent central government;   prospective member states each of which brings with it an own-revenue    administration. A   
large geographic horn-of-Africa area (44th of 267 countries) but, relative to geographic area, a relatively small population (11 m. 
in 2015).   
  
Centralized Model Centralization may “fit” with size of country, political culture & history, and/or legacy of colonial presence  
Sweden  
(unitary) 
 21 counties (OECD 
classified as local 
governments)        
In Sweden, all taxes are collected by the central government. Regional tax authorities operate under the supervision of the 
National Tax Board.  Attesting that   centralized   revenue administration need not imply a lack of decentralized revenue 
autonomy, the OECD   data show that, due to nearly full   discretion that local governments have over setting the local tax rate 
at the margin (e.g.,   “piggybacked” surcharges on central governments),   Swedish local governments   rank among the most 
fiscally decentralized   of local governments in OECD member states.  A similarly high degree of central revenue administration   
 
7/21/201810:54 PM  
Page 45 
but with more   restricted local   discretion on own-tax rates occurs in the other Scandinavian countries of   Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland and Norway   (JM, 20073; OECD 2011).  
Vietnam  
(unitary)  
58 provinces and 5 
municipalities   





oblasts, 22 republics 
(one of which, Crimea, 
is disputed), 4 
autonomous okrugs 
(districts), 9 kray, 2 
federal cities, 1 
autonomous oblast. 
World’s largest 
geographical area.    
Although the Russian Constitution reads as an asymmetrical   federal system, with respect to tax   practice the Russian   
Federation is more unitary than federal. Though subnational governments may levy taxes assigned to them—e.g.,    surcharges 
attached to a central tax (e.g.,   the enterprise profit tax) and    local retails sales taxes, subnational governments have no formal 
tax administration powers (JM).   Taxpayers pay taxes to all governments through the Federal Tax Service. This sometimes 
results in under collection of subnational taxes because the   Service, as federal body, is interested in primarily collecting the 
taxes that accrue to the federal budget (Deryugin and Kurlyandskaya).      
French  West 
Africa (unitary) 
Colonial legacy  Generally: countries with limited revenue autonomy, accompanied by limited own-revenue administration; typically 
accompanied by tax sharing at the Central government’s discretion. 
Cambodia  
(unitary)  
23 provinces, local 
communes, and the 
municipality of  Phnom 
Penh 
Minor taxes assigned to provincial governments  
Independent Tax Authorities Each type of government is given the revenue administration role consistent with the taxes assigned to/enacted by each 
government.  Various coordination mechanisms between or among SNGs may be established (e.g., tax base conformity, joint 
audits). This model tends to be associated with medium/large federal countries (MVT, 2010).    
Australia 
(federal) 
Six (6) states and two 
self-governing 
territories   
 Per the national constitution, the federal government solely levies and   administers the “major” broad based taxes: (i) customs 
and excise duties, and taxes based on (i) value added (tax on goods and service); (ii)  individual and corporate net income and 
income.  Independent state/territorial governments administer payroll taxes and taxes on land transfer taxes.  Municipalities  
levy and collect the   real estate tax, for which the states take on the role of assessment administration (JM, MVT).  The 
state/territorial/local governments have full   own-tax rate setting discretion   (OECD, 2011). 
  
Table 3. Illustrations of Significant Features of Revenue Administration, continued  
Country or 
Region 
Non-Revenue  Profile 
Note 
Description   
United States  
(loose federal) 
50 states, s federal 
district that has both 
state and local fiscal, 
89,004 local 
governments.      
The US constitution contains no detailed revenue assignments to the federal or state governments other than to vest the federal 
government the (i)  exclusive authority to tax foreign imports and  (ii) concurrent authority (with the states) to levy other  
unspecified taxes. No taxes are “assigned” to the states since, as sovereign fiscal entities, state governments possess inherent 
plenary tax and tax administration powers. The federal government mainly relies on taxes on income (personal and corporate), 
payroll,   estates, and various excises. The states independently levy administer taxes on a wide range of taxes on income and 
sales.    Local governments, which are chartered by the states, rely mainly on real estate taxes, user charges, and, with the 
permission of its state, levies on income and sales that may, or may not, piggyback on a state tax base. (Kincaid, 2012). 
Moreover, as sovereign entities, they are free to join and jointly administer multijurisdictional special taxing and fee generating 
districts for purpose of regulating commerce, and financing and funding of infrastructure modes and schools (EW).    






loose  federal) 





counties   
German intergovernmental arrangements attest to the practice that in a functioning federal state there often is, but that there 
is no a priori reason why there must be,   a relationship between revenue autonomy and   revenue administration.   Tax policy is 
fully centrally determined: the constitution assigns revenues from particular taxes to subnational government (thus a first-
glance indicator of sub-central revenues as a percent of local revenues suggests Germany is decentralized), and yet the sub-
central governments have no discretion over tax rates or other aspects of tax structure (RB, MVT). Thus, with respect to revenue 
policy, Germany is the most fiscally centralized of OECD states.(OECD, 2011)    However,  with the exception of federally 
managed and collected customs duties, some excise taxes (e.g., on beer), the VAT on imports and charges imposed within the 
framework of the European Union, it is the state/ länder (or, if the lander so delegates, its municipalities) that, subject to broad 
federal guidelines (e.g.,   uniform application of the law), is fully in charged with the role of revenue administration.   Not only do 
the länders administer almost all German taxes, they also have wide latitude in how to organize their administrative agencies. 




26 Cantons with 2,294 
canton dependent 
municipalities and in 
some cantons further 





With a history of a (i) loose confederation (a treaty-based system of independent states (1815-1848) to that of a federation 
wherein power is shared between the center and constituent/ or member states (1848-present) and (ii) people many of whom 
to today still need to be suspect of “creeping centralization”,   Switzerland is among the most fiscally decentralized of nations 
(Linder, 1994; Dafflon, 2007; OECD, 2011).  Reflecting an emphasis on the sovereignty of cantons and communes, the Swiss 
Constitution is explicit in a vertical separation of taxing powers: indirect taxation of consumption, excises, and customs du ties 
are exclusively central; direct taxes on personal income and wealth and on business income may be levied concurrently by all 
types of governments, and each government may have full or partial authority for more than one tax base (MVT).  Further 
reflecting the Swiss tax culture, the Cantons are responsible for administering their own revenues as well as all direct federal 
taxes (MVT).             
 23 Provinces, 5 
autonomous regions   4 
 The world most populated country (1.4 b 2016) and 4th in  geographic area  China by practice has  one of the world’s most  
decentralized fiscal systems  with the central government accounting for only about a fourth of budgetary expenditures (Wong, 
 








counties and towns and 
townships.  
2013). It also turns out to be the country in which the tax administration look more like the German and Swiss models and for 
which an “astonishingly small central office”   relies on a vast network of provincial and local tax offices for tax collection.  
Indeed, prior to 1994, there was essentially no central tax administration (RB).      
  
Table 3. Illustrations of Significant Features of Revenue Administration, concluded.  
Country or 
Region 
Non-Revenue  Profile 
Note 
  






A central authority with 
two “first order” 
entities plus an 
internationally 
supervised district 
(Brcko) which is  a self 
governing unit under 
the sovereignty of 
Bosnia Herzegovina and 
held in condominium 
between the two 
entities  
Established as a confederation in 1995 the “Three Nation State” (FW)   of Bosnia and Herzegovina   (BiH)   has a fiscally weak 
State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and two sovereign entities:   the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Serb/Bosnian Republika Srpska (RS). The Bosnia War (1992-1995)  post-conflict arrangement  agreed to by the warring 
reflects the decentralized fiscal legacy of Yugoslavia, in which most revenues were raised and retained by the decentralized 
republics  (BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) that made transfers  to fund the federal government. 
This “upward” transfer arrangement   created considerable budget uncertainty and vulnerability for the federal government 
(World Bank, 2015). Distribution on the basis of origin of revenue generated further generated   substantial interregional 
(horizontal) inequity. With the support of international actors a harmonized customs law was adopted in 1998 followed by 
harmonized excise taxes in 2000 and sales taxes in 2001   Agreement on the introduction of a national VAT was reached in the 
mid-2000s and implemented on January 1, 2006. With the VAT came the establishment of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Indirect Tax authority. The parties agreed to share   VAT revenues on a formula based transfer system that guaranteed shared 
revenues to the  cantons and municipalities in the Federation and,   the   municipalities of the  Republika Srpska  (the Serb 
Republic does not have a  Canton level of government). One result has been a significant reduction if horizontal fiscal disparities 





Ten (10) provinces and 
3 territories. 
Measured as a sub-central taxes as a percent of total tax revenue (49.4%), Canada ranks as the   most fiscally decentralized 
OECD country (OECD 2011).  Inter alia, the provinces are free to determine which SNG tax bases they do, or do not, choose to 
adopt (e.g.,     one province and three territories do not levy a sales tax) and have near full tax rate discretion (one province a nd   
three territories do not levy a sales tax). However, Canadian   revenue administration   is substantially less decentralized than (as 
noted below)   in China, Germany and the United States (RB, 2015).  The federal Canadian Revenue Agency administers 
provincial personal income taxes in nine provinces, corporate income taxes in eight provinces, and general sales taxes in five 
provinces. Of special importance to note is the asymmetrical system of tax administration. Thus, Quebec administers   federal 
value-added tax (Goods and Services Tax, GST) on behalf of the federal government, for which the federal government pays a 
collection fee to the province (RB, 2015). Income from petroleum operations are separately taxed and administered  by the 







communities, “5 Places 
of Sovereignty” each of 
which is administered 
directly by the central 
government. This 
includes the 2 
One will note that in the left column there Spain is not identified as either clearly federal or unitary …it’s just a real mix and 
difficult to characterize—a classic case, even more so than Canada, of asymmetrical decentralization   (RB). Harty (2005) notes it 
is “not a federation…nor is it a state made up of constituent unit…but that it does share many of the institutional features of a 
federal state”.  The Spanish Constitution recognizes both the “indissoluble unity” and “indivisible country”, yet there are 
constitutional provisions that promote aspects of federalism and that for all communities   autonomy is a voluntary right (Harty, 
SH, JMM). For centuries the communities of Navarra and the Basque Country have had a special political arrangement ( fueros), 
whereby, inter alia, “tax revenues are and always have been collected at buy the state” the state level (via its three provinces 
 






autonomous cities of 
Ceuta and Melilla plus 
three small Islands in 
the  Mediterranean 
Alboran Sea.   
that make up the state: Nafarroa, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa).These regions have administrative control over all their revenues an d 
all central taxes other than import duties and payroll taxes (RB). Other states have also established their own tax administration 
departments. As for the overall degree of state/local fiscal autonomy, on the OECD scale of percent of autonomous tax 
revenues as a percent of total government revenues is, perhaps surprising so, falls in the mid-range of fiscal autonomy.   
 Notes: The shorthand format embedded in the table refer to the following:   JM: Mikesell, 2007; MVT: Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2010: EW: Ebel & Wang, 2017; FW: Fox and Wallace, 2007. 
The profile column draws from the CIA Factbook.   
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